

The New World Geopolitics and the Effect of the Trump Era

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the transformations in contemporary global geopolitics through the lens of the Trump era's impact on United States foreign policy. Drawing on a theoretical framework that links power, space, and order, the study analyzes the shift from a nuclear-era paradigm to a digital-era paradigm, tracing how this transition reshapes hegemony, technological dominance, and coercive capacity among great powers. Particular attention is given to the "Trump Doctrine" and its America First orientation—characterized by protectionism, unilateralism, and disregard for traditional alliances—and to its differentiated effects across Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and transatlantic security, and the Asia-Pacific. The analysis further explores the strategic role of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, 5G/6G infrastructure, and digital sovereignty, as new domains of great-power competition, alongside their implications for critical infrastructure resilience and cybersecurity. The article also addresses the erosion of multilateral governance, the weakening of institutions such as the WTO and WHO, and the growing relevance of public diplomacy in an increasingly contested information environment. Finally, it considers the consequences of these shifts for international security, focusing on nuclear proliferation, regional crisis management, and strategic stability between the United States, Russia, and China. The study concludes that the redistribution of global power in the transition toward a post-nuclear, digital order challenges the traditional primacy of the nation-state and demands new frameworks of governance, cooperation, and deterrence.

Keywords: Geopolitics; United States foreign policy; Trump Doctrine; global governance; digital era; artificial intelligence; cybersecurity; nuclear proliferation; strategic stability; Latin America

1. INTRODUCTION

Latin America and the Caribbean have been the stage for transformations in the map of actors, interests, and vulnerabilities. The region's new geopolitics, together with the reconfiguration of Europe and transatlantic security, the complex context in the Asia-Pacific, and the impact of cyberspace and technological competition, are producing changes in trade, supply chains, and cooperation on climate change. At the same time, the deterioration of global governance has renewed the focus on institutional reform and on new demands for international security.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics can be understood as the interrelation between power, space, and order. These concepts are key to analyzing the international order and the projection of power by actors within the international system. On this basis, it becomes possible to examine contemporary geopolitical theory in depth and its implications for power politics in all its dimensions. Transformations in the distribution of power within the international system, framed within an era of paradigm shifts, have brought about major alterations in the centers of global power, in technological dominance, in coercive capacity, and in the governance of the system. The geopolitics of the new century has begun to take shape within the framework of these alterations.

Transformations in the distribution of power within the international system, framed within an era of paradigm shifts, have brought about major alterations in the centers of global power, in technological dominance, in coercive capacity, and in the governance of the system. The geopolitics of the new century has begun to take shape within the framework of these alterations. At the international level, the digital era—which includes the revolution in information and communication technologies—is reshaping the traditional rules of the game. Hegemony, one of the essential dimensions for the projection of global power, is in crisis. Structural changes bring with them geopolitical, economic, and strategic challenges that, by their very nature, tend to be difficult to foresee and manage.

3. REFORMULATING GLOBAL POWER IN THE POST-NUCLEAR AND DIGITAL ERA

Changes in the distribution of global power and the emergence of new paradigms in international politics—particularly the post-nuclear and digital paradigms—are at the core of this research. On the technological front, the development of artificial intelligence is central, along with its implications for competitiveness, cybersecurity, cyberwarfare, and global governance. Taken together, these elements point to whether power in practice continues to concentrate around the United States and China, and what kinds of dominance and dependency this may give rise to.

Changes in the distribution of global power and the new paradigms in international politics—particularly the post-nuclear era and the digital age—underlie the effects of the Trump era. The convergent growth of China and other emerging powers, even though their capacity to create *de facto* hegemonies remains limited, constrains the ability of the United States to impose its will in every scenario. Digitalization is transforming the nature of technological dominance and, therefore, of hegemony, if not of power in practice. New technologies determine coercive capacity in conventional terms and the ability to calibrate measured military responses. Moreover, efforts to establish global rules are limited by the effects of digitalization on the exercise of sovereignty.

3.1. Shifting Strategic Alliances

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the impact has been considerable. The foreign policy decisions of the Trump administration have reconfigured the way the United States operates on the continent. New actors and their decisions have opened space for intervention by China, Russia, Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, India, while weakening the role of European powers and Japan. New priorities and actors have defined a new era. The region faces greater fragmentation, uncertainty, and risk, and the new actors and their decisions have opened up a series of vulnerabilities that extra-hemispheric powers may exploit.

United States foreign policy has undergone a process of fracture and deterioration in recent decades. The foreign-policy structures of the most powerful country in the hemisphere have shifted from being a point of reference to being a source of tension. The national security doctrine promoted by the Trump administration has created a new bias in the formulation of strategic decisions. This new paradigm does not mean that economic, commercial, and financial factors no longer play a role, but rather that decisions now emerge within a different context, one in which the military factor and a protectionist approach are taking on a central role.

3.2. Competition Among Powers and Multilateralism

Since the beginning of the digital era, competition for leadership in the development, training, and mastery of information and communication technology (ICT) has acquired unprecedented prominence. Although the advance and adoption of ICT are universal in nature, since they affect all countries, its especially strategic and decisive character for states in their mutual relations has become evident. There is broad agreement, based on the analysis of multiple indicators, that supremacy in ICT infrastructure and applications confers significant advantages in every aspect of power, including the economy and cyberwarfare. For this reason, any actor lacking significant capabilities in this domain will find itself relegated to a condition of subordination.

The expansion of ICT, together with the arrival of social media and business models concentrated in digital commerce, has called into question states' ability to fulfill the regulatory and oversight functions they are responsible for exercising internationally—particularly the hegemonic power. The digitalization of the economy, politics, and warfare has not only transcended territorial borders; it has eroded them. In this sense, it has also challenged international relations theories that treated sovereignty as an irreplaceable normative principle in international interactions. Nevertheless, no country is willing to cede its sovereignty in the political sphere, nor to relinquish the use of coercive tools in its relations with other powers.

3.3. The Role of Non-State Actors

The impact of digitalization has been uneven and poorly harmonized, both across regions of the world and within individual states. From the spread of artificial intelligence to the securitization of telecommunications, and including debates over spectrum, 5G/6G, and network fragmentation, the implications of digitalization for the role of private actors and for the interaction between the private and public sectors are evident. Non-state actors have therefore acquired a growing prominence. The development of information and telecommunications technologies has, on one hand, allowed non-state actors to become the leading producers, owners, and operators of critical infrastructure, and, on the other, allowed private companies to advance fastest in the use of artificial intelligence. These changes have brought new risks and vulnerabilities, as well as new challenges for national governments.

The digital era has reduced the coercive capacities of hegemonic powers and has pushed a growing number of state and non-state actors to make intensive, strategic use of technologies and the data generated in the digital environment, while devoting greater attention to managing and defending their digital sovereignty. However, digitalization has not done away with the nature of power, which remains essentially coercive. On the contrary, the crisis of trust and legitimacy affecting traditional actors has helped make other types of actors—who, within the network, play a decisive role in shaping the effectiveness of normative frameworks and the protection of sovereignty—more visible and explicit.

4. EFFECTS OF THE TRUMP ERA ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

United States foreign policy has been defined by a set of principles that reflect a single underlying logic. Under the Trump administration these principles were expressed, though with important nuances, in what has come to be called the "Trump Doctrine" or "America First Doctrine." This, in turn, has been translated into a set of decisions and actions that mark the priorities of foreign policy. Trump's foreign policy priorities are trade, investment, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity. These priorities, and the way they are pursued, reveal a pattern of biases that at times reinforce one another. The protectionist approach, the push to relocate factories, and the disregard for developing new technologies in strategic areas have contributed to significant tensions within the international system.

The most notable decisions in these areas have provoked strong reactions from non-state actors, such as automotive industries lobbying in favor of investment in the United States and against tariff policies. In general terms, trade policy has irritated many countries and regions, but the responses have generally been measured and have not led to a comparable deployment of countermeasures. The response of the European Union, which has felt the impact of Trump's policy most acutely, is a good example. Added to this trade policy are tensions in security policy, especially in the transatlantic sphere, with traditional Cold War allies, as well as with wealthy extra-continental countries with different political cultures. Relations with historic adversaries—Russia and China—have likewise not escaped the impact of the Trump era, although in both cases this impact is not the sole cause.

4.1. Doctrine and Strategic Priorities

United States foreign policy during the presidency of Donald Trump is framed within a doctrine presented as a 180-degree turn from previous administrations. The idea may be tempting, but a more precise interpretation calls for greater care. The White House website dedicated to setting out the administration's foreign policy principles presents it as the "Trump Doctrine," conceived in opposition to the "Obama Doctrine." Throughout the electoral campaign, the then-candidate insisted that the Obama administration's foreign policy had been the worst in United States history and that the world was more dangerous today than at the end of the Cold War. These same elements—tied to a failure to heed intelligence-service warnings, a failure to impose sanctions on Russia, the negotiation of the nuclear deal with Iran, and the policy toward North Korea—are cited in support of that claim.

The main news generated by Trump's arrival in government is that United States foreign policy is now articulated around the country's interests rather than around alliances built over more than seventy years. Other claims—such as the declaration that American troops will never leave Afghanistan, the duration of the intervention in Syria, or the tightening of sanctions against North Korea—have been taken with a grain of salt, since they can be qualified, modified, or even reversed by a successor administration. The same applies to the restructuring of NATO and of the relationship with Mexico, which, although a pillar of the new president's policy, could be revisited by a future government.

4.2. Trade Policy and Transnational Responses

The trade policy defined by the Trump administration, which favored protectionism and deregulation, was assessed as inconsistent and contradictory, with variations depending on the region and the moment. At the strategic level, however, it was possible to agree with the president's assessment of the fragility of the American

economy and his call to strengthen domestic investment and production. But the factor generating the greatest concern was the trade war with China, on which the following diagnosis had been outlined: "The trade war with China is not a war the world wants, but it is also a war the world cannot avoid: China is a regional power that has embarked on a clear decision to displace the United States. This decision has led China to attempt to build a global economic architecture that benefits it and to militarily threaten its neighbors. The trade war is an attempt to slow China's advance. China's response is a defense of its own development, but it comes accompanied by a military escalation that generates tensions in the region. Although the trade war is not desirable, it should not be avoided at any cost.

Trade protectionism has a clear negative impact on the multilateral trading system. But the architecture of this system has been weakened for some time. The outbreak of the pandemic exposed the fragility of global production chains. The Biden administration has taken note of these vulnerabilities and has proposed a reconfiguration of cooperation agreements that prioritizes the production and supply of strategic goods within the region. The response of the global economy is a search for greater resilience rather than a return to the globalization of the previous decade." The United States economy had also been challenged by the digitalization process, which allowed individual entrepreneurs to build multinational companies without needing an industrial base and, therefore, without requiring a large economic system like that of the United States—as was the case with Apple or Amazon. The economy had become internationalized, but a vast movement of disinvestment and reshoring toward domestic production had also grown.

4.3. Tensions with Traditional Allies and Adversaries

During the Trump administration, unprecedented tensions arose in United States relations with its historic allies; demands multiplied and past concessions were reversed. Within NATO, the defense spending of certain member states was no longer merely a matter for debate but became a condition for discussing the Alliance's very legitimacy. The position of European countries regarding radical Islam, Iran, and the war in Syria—which included their rejection of military intervention—became unacceptable to Washington. In the Pacific, allies were called upon to adopt a new policy toward North Korea, one that included support for a nuclear power, the breakdown of the nuclear agreement, and pressure to implement the preventive use of force. The U.S. president dismissed the European Union as an adversary, and his foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere became dependent on domestic politics, support for Guaidó's leadership, and opposition to migration.

Tensions with traditional adversaries likewise reached unprecedented levels. The United States' position in dialogue with North Korea had a moment of theatrical presidential engagement but was unable to reduce the risk of war or of nuclearization on the peninsula. Relations with Iran moved from distance to hostility, yet failed to prevent the development of nuclear capability and ballistic missiles. Including Venezuela in the "axis of evil" did not help resolve the crisis, despite the ideological shift of the opposition, and the threat of intervention against the Maduro dictatorship failed to consolidate regional cooperation or halt migration.

5. REGIONAL AND HEMISPHERIC IMPACTS

The processes analyzed in the preceding sections generate visible changes in Latin America and the Caribbean. The interest of extra-regional powers, such as China and Russia, and the activity of non-state actors, such as transnational organizations and organized crime, have an evident impact on the region. These changes test both

states and multilateral bodies by altering balances of power and development interests. These transformations include disruptions to some of the region's defense systems and growing trade asymmetry.

At the same time, Latin America and the Caribbean are affected by shifts in United States foreign policy. Trump's election in 2016 amplified the 180-degree turn that had already begun under the Obama administration, shaped by the pivot to Asia-Pacific and energy decoupling. In terms of foreign policy, the new administration leaned toward anti-globalization, unilateralism, short-term interests, the real economy, disregard for multilateral commitments, and disdain for allies. These priorities carry consequences of both short- and long-range scope.

5.1. Latin America and the Caribbean

The region has been important to Washington's foreign policy. Its geographic proximity, its level of development, the integration of its countries into international trade, the interest in promoting investment, and the interest in ensuring compliance with minimum trade rules have combined in the pursuit of a continent with the freest possible trade relations. However, changes in the foreign policy of the Trump administration, marked by an obsession with limiting China's growth, have reconfigured these relations. On one hand, rising tensions with Beijing have opened opportunities for countries in the region that produce goods in demand among the Chinese. On the other, the turn toward Asia has expanded the space for non-traditional external actors to deploy their own diplomacy in the region.

The trajectories of Latin American and Caribbean countries are heterogeneous, not only because their governments span the political spectrum, but also for economic and social reasons. Some countries have experienced sustained growth over the past decade, others have seen more limited development, and a group of nations finds itself in crisis. The use of digital network technology and remote work allowed developed countries to weather the pandemic at lower cost than countries lacking the same capabilities. The shift in focus toward Asia has generated risks and opportunities that countries must weigh with caution.

5.2. Europe and Transatlantic Security

Latin America and the Caribbean have long been, and remain, the region of the world most affected by the "hijacking" of international politics. United States interest in the region has traditionally been shaped by geographic proximity, the desire to secure its borders, and the protection of what it considers its "backyard." The policies applied have been governed by the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, which sanctioned interference in the region in violation of the sovereignty of its states, reducing them to so-called "banana republics." Throughout history, United States policy toward Latin America has been cyclical, alternating between periods of "repression" and periods of "neglect."

The Trump era has once again brought the effects of U.S. policy on Latin America and the Caribbean to the forefront. The new president has sought to place relations with China at the top of his foreign policy priorities and to reconfigure international trade and U.S. trade policy. He has also sought to preserve domestic industries producing basic and consumer goods, while showing disdain toward the United States' traditional allies in the region and the world. The response of regional states and transnational actors is of vital importance for the reconfiguration of United States foreign policy and its effects on hemispheric security.

5.3. Asia-Pacific and the Reconfiguration of Powers

Economics and transnational politics lie at the center of global geopolitical tensions. In the Asia-Pacific, China's rapid growth has raised uncertainty over the future of American hegemony and the standing of other powers, generating geopolitical tensions in the region at multiple levels. At stake are not only bilateral relations between these powers but also the region's stability and its institutional organization. Difficulties in negotiating new rules of the game for the Pacific, together with a vision of common interest that takes into account each actor's specific position, are the focal point of new alliance-building efforts.

The reconfiguration of power in the Indo-Pacific has led the Group of Seven to strengthen its commitment to the centrality of Southeast Asian nations and to express interest in cooperation with Korea, Japan, and Australia. The creation of bilateral and multilateral defense and security agreements—such as AUKUS, the Quad, the defense pact between Japan and the United Kingdom, and other initiatives—is a sign of collective interest in securing the Indo-Pacific region against Chinese ambitions. This interest lies not only in the growth of Chinese power but also in the nature of its rise and in the way it manages to expand its influence across multiple dimensions, both military and economic.

6. TECHNOLOGY, CYBERSECURITY, AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION

Global technological competition is unfolding within a markedly adversarial international relations context. Access to and control over telecommunications infrastructure, particularly 5G and 6G, has become a domain of confrontation between the United States and China, both of which are involved in governing the radio spectrum and the integrity of the network as a whole. Artificial intelligence—its development and control—and digital sovereignty, especially the capacity to accumulate and control data, are other significant dimensions of this competition. The quality of each country's and region's critical infrastructure, and its resilience against threats, including sabotage, are increasingly relevant strategic considerations.

The war between Russia and Ukraine placed the protection of critical infrastructure on the global agenda. Cybersecurity operations were, for the most part, defensive in nature, with the protection of critical infrastructure taking priority. However, offensive capabilities and defensive robustness are both indispensable requirements. In this context, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure was determined by proximity to the conflict, disputes over its control, and the interest the attacking country had in its destruction. Alongside the defense of critical infrastructure, the security of strategic supply chains—particularly the inputs required for semiconductor production—has gained prominence.

6.1. Telecommunications and 5G/6G

The battle over telecommunications is central to the pursuit of technological dominance, and 5G, key to the mass development of artificial intelligence, marks a turning point. The radio spectrum network, considered a global good by its very nature and because it cannot be substituted, requires more inclusive and legitimate governance. The fragmentation of cyberspace, which prevents interconnection with the rest of the world, is a form of economic warfare and technological isolation.

5G technology, owing to its capacity for mass connectivity, and 6G, still under development, owing to its proximity to quantum chips and quantum data processing, mark a break point in world geopolitics. Low-cost, high-capacity communication—including augmented-reality devices—together with a quantum internet

dominated by artificial intelligence, will enable new modes of production and new facilities for the use of AI. What in the previous phase was the computing and smartphone revolution, which affected the production cycle of industry and commerce, is now being multiplied by AI-driven processes.

6.2. Artificial Intelligence and Digital Sovereignty

Artificial intelligence makes it possible to apply an immense flow of data to increase productivity and optimize decision-making in companies and governments. At the same time, facial-, image-, and voice-recognition technologies constitute powerful tools of social control and repression. The decisions of the technology giants, given their scale and technological power, become matters of state. An increasing number of countries are establishing regulations to guarantee control over and the security of local data. The differing horizons of technological development raise questions of dependency, dominance, and digital sovereignty.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the emerging technologies most capable of transforming everyday life around the world. Recent advances in natural language processing, computer vision, and voice recognition, combined with growing computational capacity and unprecedented data accumulation, have revolutionized the development of AI applications. These have expanded their use in daily life, and the results produced by some of them, such as ChatGPT, have generated both wonder and concern. As they are brought to market, large companies and governments alike are also investing in their development, viewing them as strategic for the future.

6.3. Critical Infrastructure and Resilience

Critical infrastructures, by their nature, are strategic elements for a country's national security and economy. The interdependence they create among themselves and their connections with other countries suggest that their security transcends what any single national provision can guarantee. For this reason, the risks associated with critical infrastructure, and the capacity to withstand its failures (resilience), must be taken into account in bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation. A country's ability to treat its critical infrastructure system as a single system with a uniform level of vulnerability or resilience should not be taken for granted. Its assessment is shaped by a country's political will and, in particular, by its relationship with whichever country provides or controls that system.

Attention to critical infrastructure also highlights the link between security, economics, and technology. Today, the design, production, and control of most of the continent's critical infrastructure lies with private providers, many of them transnational. Moreover, the balance of power in the digital world is, to a large degree, the result of control over critical infrastructure by information and knowledge companies. If one accepts that the security a country provides for its critical infrastructure must also guarantee its sovereignty and control over its economy, questions arise about how to protect that security in the face of products, technologies, and services with a high foreign component.

7. ECONOMY, TRADE, AND TRADE REALIGNMENTS

Trump's foreign policy seeks a radical realignment of United States trade relations, putting an end to the era of unrestricted expansion of world trade and to the growing economic interdependence among the various powers; the intention is for the country to gain directly from every exchange, reducing its trade deficit with all trading partners. To achieve these goals, the U.S. president is pushing for greater protectionism and is likely to pursue a

series of bilateral or plurilateral agreements rather than multilateral ones. In the short term, a realignment of global supply chains is expected, aimed at increasing the industrial resilience of the United States.

The global trading economy currently faces the crisis generated by COVID-19 and its effects on growth, supply, and demand. The situation is further complicated by climate change and the demands of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapting to their effects. However, international cooperation in these two areas still lags behind cooperation on pandemic control. Proposals to change behavior and capital flows, aimed at mobilizing resources toward the Global South and meeting adaptation goals, remain far from being realized. Fears over difficulties facing the real economy in the Global North, together with the effect of protectionism, are reducing the appetite for investment in high-risk locations.

7.1. Protectionism, Agreements, and Supply Chains

The Trump administration has increased protectionism through tariffs and the reassertion of "buy American" policies. The early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains, spurring investment in local manufacturing and the building of strategic reserves. The recovery has been marked by component shortages, inflationary pressures, and the pursuit of industry support through subsidies, tax benefits, and economic nationalism. Trade agreements still under negotiation in Asia and Europe contain growth-oriented components, but they are unable to stem the growth of foreign trade.

Trade protectionism has found an important place in the economic policy of the Trump administration, opening a new cycle in international economic relations. The measures adopted are aimed at expanding U.S. industrial production through the implementation of tariffs, "buy American" policies, infrastructure investment, spending on research and development, and the crucial revival of the economy's physical capital, which had shown declining growth for more than three decades.

7.2. Climate Change and Economic Cooperation

The fight against climate change is a challenge that requires cooperation from all countries, regardless of their level of development. The Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement and began rolling back environmental regulations. This position has generated adverse reactions, although it has not halted progress toward meeting existing commitments. Economic losses stemming from extreme weather conditions are rising, and the development of clean technologies is essential to achieving the goals that have been set.

Climate change continues to generate adverse effects on the economies of many countries. Droughts, floods, and hurricanes have caused losses amounting to billions of dollars in the United States and on virtually every continent. Mitigating and adapting to climate change will require investments of more than five trillion dollars over the next decade, and various studies agree that a significant share of that investment should flow toward developing countries. Moreover, advances in clean technologies and international cooperation on their costs are essential to fulfilling the commitments made under the Paris Agreement, which seek to limit the rise in global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

8. CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Diplomatic activity and foreign policy—including the management and promotion of a country's image, communications policy, and cultural ties—are also a form of pursuing power on the international stage. Ultimately, power no longer resides solely in material resources but also in the capacity to influence, to persuade,

and to induce others to act in accordance with one's own interests. International security studies have reached the same conclusion: security is not confined to the military or to physical space but encompasses the full range of activities that ensure the maintenance of peace and security.

However, not everything favors the position of the United States. In fact, global governance faces considerable challenges. Multilateral institutions have lost part of their legitimacy and suffer from paralysis in decision-making. The various global transformations in security, the economy, and the political order have left regional and global decision-making engines running at half power. The paralysis afflicting the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the low participation of world leaders at the last United Nations summit, the lack of resolve among member states regarding reforms to the World Health Organization (WHO), and the growing doubts surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO) in recent years are all examples of this crisis.

8.1. International Organizations and Legitimacy

The legitimacy of multilateral governance, as reflected in its institutions, is a recurring theme in the analysis of international relations, since the political, economic, and social problems affecting the international community—whether national or global—are numerous and complex, and their management cannot be undertaken by a single country or a small group of countries. For this reason, the design, capacities, and behavior of specialized bodies are examined below, along with some of their most salient characteristics.

Legitimacy plays a central role in the effectiveness of multilateral governance and its institutions, which must be perceived not only as actors contributing to the resolution of today's global problems, but also as bodies equipped with the means necessary to carry out that function. However, the growing complexity of these problems, the limited scope of action of existing institutions, the rise of new actors, and the emergence of new problems have made clear that the current governance regime is insufficient and that new mechanisms of governance, collaboration, and mutual consideration are required.

8.2. Public Diplomacy and International Opinion

The shifts in power and world order already discussed have affected global governance and the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy. However, these are not the only factors that determine foreign policy. The way countries convey their messages and ideas abroad, and the receptiveness those messages find around the world, also play a vital role. This dimension of international politics is known as public diplomacy and international opinion, and it includes the actions of governments and individuals that create, modify, or preserve the perceptions held by the peoples of other countries, or of any given global actor.

Public diplomacy has become an essential element within the global strategy of major actors. The transformation of the digital economy and the dominance of social media allow a message to be disseminated on a planetary scale, while also providing a tool for gathering information and interpreting opinion trends in real time. Private investment and the development of new information technologies have driven an explosive proliferation of communication platforms. The most important of these belong not to states or traditional actors but to private conglomerates. This phenomenon has led to the emergence of an international public opinion that escapes government control but that can, in turn, be monitored and used for diplomatic and foreign-policy purposes.

9. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The persistent erosion of international governance and the lack of agreement on basic norms of coexistence heighten the risk of a more dangerous world. It isolates actors with nuclear potential and encourages the development of weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. Regional crises threaten to escalate, and the management of tensions grows increasingly fragile, while efforts to resolve disputes remain scarce. Relations among the great powers now rival those of the Cold War era, and strategic stability is weakening. The risk of an arms race is looming. The possibilities for action by non-state actors are multiplying, yet their objective generally remains to weaken the international order rather than to protect it.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains one of the central problems of international security. The international community appears incapable of implementing effective measures to prevent the development of nuclear capabilities in states with the potential to acquire them. The non-proliferation regime, whose cornerstone is the NPT, shows a growing inability to respond to the challenges that the Trump era and its aftermath pose for United States foreign policy and its relationship with North Korea and Iran.

9.1. Proliferation and Arms Control

The post-nuclear era is characterized by a shift in the nature of proliferation. Since the Cold War, nuclear powers have adopted a form of realism reflected in efforts to prevent the weapon from reaching a larger number of countries. The positions of the Soviet Union, communist China, and the Western powers, although separated by irreconcilable political antagonisms, are today closer than ever on nuclear matters. The disarmament agreements and the Non-Proliferation Treaty are the clearest examples of this understanding. These powers' aspiration is to maintain sufficient nuclear superiority for an eventual deterrence posture while preventing the weapon from reaching underdeveloped countries. New conflicts, in any case, have not disappeared but have changed in form. In a third world war, nuclear weapons would be used not with the aim of destroying the adversary but to tilt circumstances in favor of one side or the other at the moment of negotiation. It is within this Cold War-like world that proliferation remains a danger to humanity.

Despite this evidence, the world has been unable to curb proliferation. There are currently forty-four countries with nuclear facilities and seven that have achieved the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Although the international community has managed to contain the ambitions of certain countries, the danger of nuclear conflict remains present. The lack of arms-control agreements and the development of new categories of weapons raise fears of a nuclear race in regions such as the Pacific. In Asia, the international community's attempts to defuse conflicts remain far from satisfactory. Efforts to avoid a cold war in the region have failed, and the possibility of nuclear weapons use has not disappeared—all the more so given that communist China has publicly signaled its willingness to use them.

9.2. Regional Conflicts and Crisis Management

With respect to crisis management and conflict resolution, opportunities for mediation are diminishing, new sources of conflict are emerging from competition over control of digital space, and new vulnerabilities are affecting the balance of power. The prospect of conflicts driven by regional powers with historic motivations tied to territorial expansion and control of resources is far from exhausted. However, the growing destructive capacity

of these actors' arsenals presents a particular risk, since their eventual use could not be confined to the region of origin.

The inability of countries such as the United States and Russia to prevent the conflict in Ukraine, or of the United States and China regarding Taiwan, illustrates how poorly dialogue and crisis-management mechanisms are functioning. Compounding this are multiple additional flashpoints among nuclear-capable countries in other regions. These factors increase the risk of nuclear conflict as strategic stability becomes more vulnerable to miscalculation and communication failures.

9.3. Strategic Stability and Deterrence

Strategic stability appears to be under pressure: cybersecurity and competition in information and telecommunications technologies contribute to a sense of instability, but the greater danger stems from the stalemate in nuclear arms negotiations, the difficulty of managing new strategic weapons, and nuclear-arsenal modernization programs that introduce a race-like logic into conventional armament as well. Stability within this competition requires effective, trust-based dialogue about its consequences.

Relations between the United States and Russia appear to follow a characteristic pattern: when instability becomes damaging, the two powers manage to reach a containment agreement through a series of treaties. The question that arises is whether this recurring pattern will repeat itself—but this time as a cyclical pattern that drives both sides toward a point of no return. The Indo-Pacific region is crosscut by a multipolar dynamic marked by tensions of competition and cooperation among powers. In terms of deterrence, the key question is whether China's strategic capabilities provoke a deterrent response from the United States and its allies in the region.

10. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions synthesize the main findings, answer the questions posed, and analyze the implications for United States foreign policy and the areas of future research related to the evolution of contemporary global geopolitics. Contemporary geopolitics is defined as the study of international power and, in particular, of the processes and phenomena that determine changes in its distribution among states and international institutions. This discipline therefore makes it possible to analyze the transformations in United States foreign policy led by the Trump Doctrine.

The distribution of global power is being radically transformed in the transition from the nuclear era to the digital era. Digitalization is establishing paradigms that, although transitory, approximate an as-yet-undefined post-nuclear world order. Within this new framework, the technological elite and its transnational corporations assume a role in global decision-making different from the one they held during the period when coercive and military capabilities were dominant. The Digital Age is therefore characterized by growing dependence on information and communication technologies and by the dominance of a group of technology transnationals in the process of transforming the economy and society. This situation creates new problems for global governance, in which the nation-state can no longer be regarded as the sole actor, whether in terms of capabilities or of competencies.

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